A Wake Up Call On Al Shabaab Exploiting Engrained AVSEC Porosities in The Horn of Africa.

By Ahmed Taib ICAO AVSEC PM-EU

3 months after the yet to be solved Sham El Sheikh debacle in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula comes the Daallo Airlines, Mogadisco airport fiasco where soon after take-off a A321 was damaged by an explosion resulting in a large hole in the fuselage. One passenger was sucked out and killed. Another three were injured. The Daallo flight 159 to Djibouti is said to have been climbing out of Mogadishu’s -Adden Adde Airport crossing an altitude around 11000 ft, when a massive explosion occurred inside the passenger cabin.

A gaping hole on the right side of the A321 was the result with one person sitting next to the explosion center being sucked out by the following decompression with at least three other passengers being injured. It is only out of sheer luck that the explosion happened whilst the flight was still at low altitude. If the explosion had happened at a higher altitude, the hole in the fuselage might have caused more severe structural damage, rendering the whole plane to possibly even disintegrate after the explosion.

Knowing all the Mogadisco airports well from my time, when it was still the wild- wild East, from the Kilometre 50 one which had an airport fire engine converted into a Soviet 4500 effective altitude ZPU- 1 AA gun carrier, to the Kilometre 90 one to, the Adden Adde one in central Mogadishu, I would blame the incident squarely on the lack of security around the aircraft whilst on ground at Mogadishu Airport, and simply describe the facility as chaotic with zero security. For I have witnessed when an aircraft immediately parks, some 20 to 30 people dash to the would be ramp. “None of them with an airport pass of any sort, let alone reflective jackets, quite an improvement from some 10 years ago when a khat ferrying caravan or cessna would be surrounded by AK 47 and GPMG’s welding dishevelled thugs. Today, they wear designer clothes, enter and leave aircraft at will, and no one knows who is who, which basically means they can easily put anything inside when passengers leave the aircraft.”

With the non-ending insurgency from the Al Shabab and their continued deadly forays in Somalia and neighbouring states and threaten to easily transcend the borders of the horn of Africa which continue attracting Middle Eastern and Western interests. Even with Somalia’s semblance of a government committing towards tightening security at her airport(s) to prevent other threats. Al Shabab’s new interest in the porous aviation arena highlights additional security concerns in the Somali capital, including that of aircraft being struck by gunfire on approach to the city’s airport(s).

Knowing the Somalis particularly the Majartein, Hawiye and Issak, I grew up around, a passive look at Al Shabab’s evolution, simply says that a good part of their uptick is owed to the increased recruitment of youth following the 2007 invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, a hated enemy. Intense nationalism, clan ties, and war stories by veterans of Somalia's incessant wars, and its reception of a boost from radicalized Kenyan youth brainwashed to believe the existence of deliberate marginalization of Kenyan Muslims, all of beefed up the jihadist ideology.

The jihadist recruiting themes in use today emphasize religious duty, the fictitious defense of Islam against infidel aggression, restoration of honour, and the promise of paradise. Faith is one of the reasons why young men radicalize and recruit themselves to terrorism, but it is not always the major factor particularly in Kenya for that matter. Personal circumstances are more important. Would-be jihadist warriors are angry, eager for adventure, out to assuage personal humiliation and demonstrate their manhood. Many are motivated by personal crises, In Kenya terrorism does not attract the well-adjusted. They Al Shabab and those they attract are stray dogs, not lone wolves, to whom the porosities in aviation security in the horn of Africa region gives a readymade platform for them to gain the international mileage they seek.

Lest we forget, terrorists do not fall unto earth seasoned and savvy. They all start out as amateurs and get better with on-the-job experience. The absence of any continuing clandestine organization in the region does not preclude learning. Yes, the success of the likes of the Kenyan authorities at the moment has acted as a deterrent, which is a promising proposition. However, anyone capable of calculating risk should be wise enough, not to confine Al Shabab’s so called jihad efforts to braggadocio some of it on the internet, particularly because they are determined, and have the intent. To them death is a means to an end, that of getting to heaven and its promised luxuries.

We must cease drawing comfort from the fact that jihadists seem to us to be a disheveled lot devoid of any smartness, operational wise. A very short distance separates the very foolish from the extremely dangerous amongst them. Given that we have unrealistically come to expect 100 percent security from our police and militaries, a single well-orchestrated terrorist success in the aviation industry in the Eastern and the Horn of Africa region can easily provoke paroxysms of panic and overreaction. Al Shabab’s recent terrorist attack on Daallo Flight 159 is a stark reminder that the Somalia-based group poses a threat to all our interests in the region.

There are several reasons why we in Aviation Security profession in the Eastern and Horn of Africa region should be very concerned about the new trend Al Shabaab seems interested in after the Daallo flight 159 possible test run . First, they possess a competent external operational capability to strike targets outside of Somalia. A good example being the Garissa University and Westgate Mall attacks in Kenya, articulately well planned, executed, involved sophisticated intelligence collection, surveillance and reconnaissance of the targets. These skills can easily be used for more worrisome attacks, particularly against the already very porous regional civil aviation industry.

Secondly, Shabab officials, including the Pumwani-Nairobi born anointed leader of the Al Shabab Kenyan contingent one Ahmad ‘Amaadi’ Iman, a trained Mechanical Engineer by trade with a $3million bounty on his head, continues to express an interest in striking targets in the region, this it needs to be clearly known is not limited to attacks against malls, supermarkets, embassies or locations frequented by Westerners, neither does it therefore exempt aviation infrastructure. After all, Al Shabab subscribes to Al Qaeda's extremist ideology, which aims at the establishment of an extreme version of Islamic law in Somalia and views the region, it’s developing new found wealth of oil, as well as the latest American interests in areas like Djibouti as high value targets.

Thirdly, and perhaps most concerning, Al Shabab has successfully recruited dozens of Western educated proponents to fight in Somalia. Many of them may possess some disturbing skill sets that need a very a sober understanding of the group. Yes, Al Shabab has suffered a series of military defeats at the hands of Somali, Kenyan and other African forces. But as the Daallo Airlines and recent AMISOM Kenyan Contingent Base in EL Ade, Somalia attacks shows, Al Shabab has the capability to conduct high-profile attacks in the region, calling for us all to be on a high alert in Eastern and Horn of Africa region as a whole.

To make matters worse directly across the Gulf of Aden from Somalia, the remnants of Yemen smolders under the weight of the Houthi insurgency currently facing its own routing under the Saudi led Operation. Yemen is or was a critical regional U.S. ally occupying the strategically important South Western corner of the Arabian Peninsula. In the midst of all this strife lies tiny Djibouti. A country many Americans and or Westerners, for that matter may not have heard of, but has emerged as a critical staging ground for promoting stability in Eastern and Horn of Africa region, supporting operations throughout the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, which stretches from Egypt into Central Asia.

With the US extending its commitment to Djibouti with a 20-year lease last May, for use of the country's Camp Lemonnier, an expansive base of 4,000 American service members and civilians focused on counterterrorism operations. With Djibouti being adjacent to Somalia and just 17 miles across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen, it is itself an appetizing target that now changes the terrorism equation in the region. Creating a tremendous demand, for the various types of capacity building that are necessary for national and regional security, from aviation security screening, to the detecting and defusing of improvised explosive devices to monitoring persistent threats and mitigating the consequences of horrific attacks, such as those that continue to plague Kenya, and so on.

At a minimum, the US Camp Lemonnier should serve as the eyes and ears on Somalia and on militant threats stemming from this region. As well as serve as a combat hub supporting AMISOM efforts. Apart from becoming a more than the round-the-clock hours of intelligence surveillance, possibly also deploying drone strikes to target Al Shabaab to help prevent potential terrorist attacks, it should also be used by the US Department of Homeland Security’s TSA to assist the region in improving Aviation Security Management. Lest we forget since at least 2001, East Africa has been one demonstration of both the geographic extent to which militant jihadism has spread and the operational extent to which it has entrenched itself in vulnerable territories. Confronting this threat compels us East Africans to devise innovative approaches to waging sustained efforts in some of the remotest corners of the world.

The collaborative role being played by the US and Djibouti, which should at least extend to AMISOM, would represent the kind of partnerships that are now required in the battle against terrorism, because little-known places like Djibouti are one arena where the battle could be won or lost. In the immediate future, the U.S. role in the Eastern and Horn of Africa should also represent a commitment to a part of the world where security problems continue to grow and where security interests have grown increasingly common among U.S. citizens, East Africans and the region’s aviation industry.

The author is a Critical Infrastructure Protection & Transport Security Management Professional. One of the 1st Eastern & Horn of Africa's ICAO AVSEC PM's and European Aviation Security Training Institute-EASTI Belgium Graduate 

THE UNSPOKEN ENIGMA THAT SENT AVIATION SAFETY & SECURITY OVERSIGHT TO THE DOGS.

Published on September 30, 2016

Ahmed Taib ICAO AVSEC PM-EU CASM

A Conflict of Interest-COI is typically defined as a situation in which an official has private interests that can and or may be perceived to improperly influence or interfere with the performance of his or her official duties and responsibilities. Such improper influence or perceived interference could be attributed to situations involving financial interest, family, emotional life, political or national affinity of the official. In the case of Civil Aviation, organizational COI arises where the organization fails or is impeded to act impartially due to outside activities or relationships it has with other entities.

Whether we speak openly about it, or as usual sweep it under the carpet, as has been the case ever since the introduction of the “Consideration of Guidance on Conflicts of Interest motion” introduced to the General Work Programme of the Legal Committee through a proposal in the working paper A37-WP/80 presented by the United States. And a survey there after by the ICAO Secretariat some years ago. Even after it was concluded that it would be useful for all States to have a framework dealing with conflicts of interest in civil aviation given the prevalence of such situations in the civil aviation activities of States. Conflicts of interest hamper effective, independent and impartial regulation thereby posing risks to aviation safety and security.

We, unfortunately cannot run away from the pertinent need today, especially that of enacting consistent rules across the sector to establish and preserve a clear separation between civil aviation authorities and the activities that they oversee. In the given context, it is still imperative today to have rules governing conflicts of interest (“COI”) situations especially in-:

1.  Financial interests in regulated entities;

2.  The movement of individuals from positions in government to industry and vice versa; and

3.  The practice of designating or seconding personnel to carry out oversight functions on behalf of the Civil Aviation Authority.

The consideration of these elements remains very appropriate especially if we, were ever to foster an objective exercise of regulatory responsibilities. From a CAA perspective, such COI arise, principally, in two different scenarios. First, through interactions between a Government department its regulatory agencies with operating entities that are subject to regulation (such as air operators, aviation training organizations, approved maintenance organizations, design organizations, production organizations, air navigation service providers, AVSEC service providers and aerodrome operators). Examples of COI situations that arise in the course of such interactions include:

• Direct or indirect financial interests in regulated entities;
• Movement of individuals between jobs in the regulatory and regulated entities (also referred to as “revolving door” situations);
• Performance of regulatory duties by seconded or designated staff of the regulated entities;
• Partnerships or arrangements between regulatory and regulated entities to advance the commercial interests of the regulated entities at the expense of the public interest (leading to what is also referred to as “regulatory capture”); and
• Lobbying of policy or rule-making bodies on behalf of or in favour of regulated entities; 

Second, through relationships between different organs or entities of the State involved in civil aviation activities, which could include:

• Overlap of functions between regulatory bodies and the government or its other organs such as the military, police, customs and investigative bodies;
• Ownership or control of regulatory and operator entities by the State as is the case in a number of Countries; and
• Combination of regulatory and service provision functions in the same or related entities, as is the case in some Middle East countries.

It is very possible that COI (real or perceived), can arise from such interactions or relationships, and hamper effective, independent and impartial regulation. Generally, Many States have not developed legal and institutional frameworks to deal with COI in response to the requirements of their domestic law or with reference to international treaties, such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption of 2003 (UNCAC), or to guidelines or codes of best practice developed by international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or by relevant professional bodies.

Civil aviation authorities in many ICAO member States are unfortunately not subject to government-wide COI frameworks, to frameworks that apply specifically only to them, or to some combination of such frameworks. Even with ICAO promulgating certain guidance on COI, identifying the need to mitigate potential COI with respect to staff carrying out inspection duties and calling for clear separation of authority between regulatory and state controlled regulated entities, little if anything can be said of their enforcement and achievements.

Furthermore, even with a Standard as is promulgated in Annex 19 - Safety Management, in particular paragraph 3.2, which read together with paragraph 3.3 in Appendix 1, requires States to establish and implement a safety oversight system ensuring that personnel performing safety oversight functions are provided with guidance that addresses ethics, personal conduct and the avoidance of actual or perceived COI in the performance of official duties, many CAA’s have deliberately continued to turn a blind eye on it.

ICAO’s Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) findings in this area have been that, in a number of States, where operator or service provider functions are carried out by the State, there is no distinct separation of responsibilities between the regulatory bodies and air operators, aerodrome operators, service providers and aviation training centres and that most States that use experts seconded by the State’s civil aviation administration or other organization in the State as investigators, have not established measures to avoid possible COI.

Under the Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP), it is reported that “quite a number of States are yet to ensure that the functions and responsibilities of the various entities within the civil aviation security system are clearly defined to ensure that there are no overlaps of responsibilities”.

Today financial interests in regulated entities as well as social interests of individuals, (leading in some cases to corrupt practices, nepotism and favouritism), movement of individuals between jobs in the regulatory and regulated entities, the involvement of the State in regulated activities or entities and lobbying in favour of regulated entities are amongst the most prevalent sources of COI in the Civil Aviation Industry. Other situations such as the exertion of political pressure on regulators to favour regulated entities such as National Airlines, or Ground Handling entities owned by the politically correct are an additional source of COI and a reason why regulatory oversight in many countries has gone to the dogs.

It is rather tricky since the States are involved in civil aviation activities as an operator or service provider in many States, the most prevalent activities being their engagement in the provision of air navigation services, aircraft and aerodromes operations and the management of aviation training organizations. Moreover, some civil aviation authorities depend on government subvention or revenue from regulated activities to support regulatory activities. Furthermore, States that have aircraft on the civil register that are used for military or police operations.

These relationships and activities are subject to aviation safety and security oversight by the civil aviation administration which raises the potential for vested organizational COI, whereby civil aviation regulators are unduly influenced or impeded from acting impartially in dealing with regulated entities due to common ownership and control by the State or because of having commercial interests in those entities.

Direct or indirect interest in regulated entities, partnerships or arrangements between regulatory and regulated entities to advance the commercial interests of the regulated entities at the expense of the public interest (leading to what is also referred to as “regulatory capture”) and the combination of regulatory and service provision functions in the same or related entities are the three leading situations that States put aviation safety and security most at risk.

Various situations, including movement of individuals between jobs in the regulatory and regulated entities and performance of regulatory duties by seconded or designated staff of the regulated entities, are also sources of COI albeit to a lesser extent. Political pressure being applied on the national aviation administration is a situation not openly disclosed or included in the list of elements identified as a risk to aviation safety and security.

While a majority of stakeholders may be of the view that existing ICAO guidance material on COI in civil aviation is adequate or somewhat adequate. The industry can benefit from the harmonization of COI practices and measures for dealing with COI in civil aviation. The rules or guidance on COI must in essence be developed in the form of Standards, or the development of a model code on managing COI in civil aviation while at the same time making necessary adjustments to other CAA regulations dealing with the qualifications of personnel and representatives. Which today is one of the most abused elements especially, where the executive in ICAO Member States politically appoint individuals as Minister to head Ministries in charge of civil aviation or the CAA’s.  

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